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In the Supreme Court

of the
State of Utah

FINLEY F. WILKINSON,
HAROLD N. WILKINSON AND
H. H. WILKINSON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-

vs.-

Case No.
8832

CARLOS 'VOOD,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents brought action against Appellant seeking enjoinment of a wall along a right of way, for removal of said wall by Appellant and for damages. The case
was submitted to the Jury by the Trial Court on Special
Interrogatories and from the Findings of Fact and Con-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
elusions of Law and Judgment of Trial Court based
thereon. and by which Judgment Respondents were
granted the right to remove certain p-ortion of said wall
and awarded nominal damages Appellant prosecutes
this Appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 30, 1953 by \V arranty Deed bearing
said date, Respondents obtained from Appellant the following described real property in Davis County, Utah:
''Beginning at a Point 30 Feet West and
888.88 Feet South from the Northeast Corner of
the Northeast Quarter of Section 25, T2N, R1W,
Salt Lake Meridian, U. S. Survey and running
thence West 256.66 Feet; thence North 52 Feet;
thence East 25.66 Feet; thence South 52 Feet; to
place of beginning.
Together with a right of "\Yay over and through
the following described property: Beginning at a
p·oint 2.50 chains \Y- est and 888.88 feet South from
the Northeast Corner of the Northeast Quarter of
Section 25, T2N, R1\\7 , Salt Lake ~Ieridian, U. S.
Survey and running thence South 11 Feet~ thence
West 160 Feet; thence North 11 Feet thence East
160 Feet to place of beginning.'
Such Instrument is Respondents' Exhibit B and note
should be made that this Appellant and \\-rife executed
such Instrument on January 6, 1954. The Right of \Y.Ry
involved in this snit and conYL\yed in connection w"ith
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.such other land Is 11 Feet in Width and 160 Feet in
Length.
Reference is made to Respondents' Exhibit A, a Certificate of Survey, for more clarification of the exact locations of the respective properties of the parties hereto
and said Right of Vv ay. Respondents' Exhibit C, a Diagram or Map, is noted as shovving the Right of vVay in
Red with the "\\Tall being designated in Blue. The Right
of vV ay is referred to at times in the testimony as the
Red Area. Exhibits 4, 5, and 6 of Appellant are Pictures
of the Right of Way and the Wall. Further referral to
all of such Exhibits will be made as requisite.
Arthur B. Maxwell, an Engineer, and vVitness for
Respondents testified: He made the Certificate of Survey, Respondents' Exhibit A. (TR. 4) He made a survey
of the property upon the ground. (TR. 5) The description contained in the Deed was the same as in the Certificate. (TR. 6) There was a Wall running from the front
of the vVilkinson Building to a point approximately even
with the front of the \Vood building. (TR 7) The wall at
one point \Vas 10.76 feet from the s-outh edge of the right
of vvay and at another point 10.48 feet from the south
edge of the described right of way. (TR. 7) At the time of
survey on December 20, 1955 there was a concrete wall
erected on the north of the right of way. (TR. 10 and 11).
Its "\viclth was six inches. ( TR. 11) It was approximately 22 feet running East and \\Test. ( TR. 11) l-Ie went
back 1o0 :F.,eet and such 160 Feet would stop at a point
14 and a half feet to the reRr of the ''Ti]kinson Bnilding.
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(TR. 13) From his observation it was being used as a
right of way and he had that morning made such observation. (TR. 14) The Witness during a recess further
verified his measurements of the wall and thereupon
testified that it was an eight inch wall with its total
width about seven and three-quarters inches with a capstone nine inches wide. (TR. 19) His Certificate showed
it to he an eight inch wall but such fact would n·ot alter
the figures he gave as his measurements were made from
the inside of the wall. (TR. 20).
Respondent, Finley Wilkinson, testified: That the
property shown in Yello'\v on the Diagram, Respondents'
Exhibit C, was the property described in Exhibit B and
was 256.66 by 52 feet. (TR. 23) At the time -he purchased
such property he also purchased the right of way back
to the property described as 256.66 by 52 feet. (TR. 24)
IIe thought that for about a year they crossed the line
at any point they desired and then at the end of such
year three posts about five feet apart in front of the
building were erected. Even after that they were able to
go between the posts. (TR. 27). They \Yere able to make
the same use of the Right of \\---ay as before by crossing
bet"w'een the steel p-osts. (TR. 28) It was inconYenient to
enter the Right of\\;'" ay from the 11 foot entrance in that
they had to go ont on the highway to n1ake sueh entrance.
(TR. 28) That they had no other right of \vay to get
from the front property to the storage property that they
bought. (TR. 29) Occasionally the right of \vay \Yas obstrurted hy his usage of it and also by that of 1\ppellaut
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( TR. 29) His estimate of damage was that it tDok more
time to take cars from the garage out on the highway and
then down through the right of way. It probably took
two to three minutes more. (TR. 31). Average daily
loss in man hours was two. ( TR. 31) His mechanics
were paid $2.20 per hour. (TR. 32) Only other interference with his use of the right of way by the wall being
there 'vas they had to maintain space open. If the 'vall
wasn't there they could back cars right out and drive
them on to the driveway and down the right of way to
the parking lot. It would give him more use of the 11
feet. ( TR. 33) The wall was first constructed in December, 1955. (TR. 33) At the tim·e he purchased the 256.66
by 52 feet, he had no right of way over the property of
the Appellant. (TR. 35 and 36) The three pipes were
placed on the north boundary of the right of way in November, 1954 after he purchased the right of way in January, 1954. (TR. 38) He sa'v a few of his customers
parked in the right of way. (TR. 40) On many occasions
Appellant had discussed with him the problem of customers of the witness coming out of the witness place of
business and using the right of way to turn around to go
south and north. (TR. 41) Besides his help and himself
no one used the right ·of way to go to the back lot of the
witness. (TR. 41 and 42) The back lot or 256.66 by 52
feet area was used to keep impounded wrecked cars and
to park customer's cars. (TR. 42) They came down the
alley every day. ( TR. 45) Before the wall was erected
the right of way demarcation was indicated by three steel
posts. (TR. 47) Because of the inconvenience caused by
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the wall, he estimated that he lost 2 hours a day in man
power. (TR. 47 and 48) He made no protest when the
steel pipes were placed on the line of the right of way
because his Attorney had advised him not to stir up any
trouble with his n,eighbor. (TR. 49)
Appellant, Carlos Wood, testified: That he and ~fr.
Dunn had sold Respondents the property in Yellow,
256.66 by 52 feet, behind their present building with said
right of way. (TR. 58) As to the amount of Right of
Way, he and Respondent, Harold Wilkinson, measured
it and came to a conclusion of 160 feet east and west by
11 feet wide. (TR. 58) The steel posts were put in on
Thanksgiving Day of 1953 after a survey had been made
for him so that he \vould be on his property line to put
the posts in. (TR. 58) In measuring the right of ''ay
\vidth, they measured from the south side of the steel
posts to his present building and it was 12 and son1e odd
feet as sho\vn on the map. (TR. 60) The steel pipes were
removed to make way for the wall. (TR. 61) The wall
was not quite finished. (TR. 62) The steel posts were
put in because the way was being used for parking purposes and people \Vere parking there. It \Yas for the benefit of both that it be used as a driveway. (TR. 62) The
steel posts were there at the time Respond·ents bought
the property in January, 1954. (TR. 63) Instead of u~1ng
the ''Access" or east entrance to the driYeway they
\vould come fron1 the side and use it side\vays and ron1e
right in to his traffic and it created a bad situation.
(TR. 6:1) I-Iis object in building the wall \Vas to make a
definite rig·ht of \Yny do\Yll through the t\YO hnRinesses
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and to stop their dumping of their refuse in to the driveway. (TR. 64) The wall was built on the same line as the
steel poles had been on. The north side of the wall was
on his property line. (TR. 64 and 65). At time of trial
Respondents were using the right of way for wreckers
and flat top trucks without any difficulty. (TR. 65 and
66) The thickness of the wall was eight inches and went
back about 55 feet. (TR. 68) The Wilkinson Building is
·encroaching on the right of way in that the footings of the
buildings are probably 16 inches into the right of way.
( TR. 68, 69 and 70) The Wall was necessary because it
made an entrance to a driveway. Before, there was no
existing driveway. They came in from any angle and it
blocked him out. Traffic came in on a cross angle. If
anybody was coming in through there, there was no
chance of getting away from it. (TR. 81) He and Respondent, Harold vVilkinson, did get together and at one
time agreed how high he should put the wall. He was
going out to where the pipe was in the first place but
Wilkinson talked him in to staying back aways. (TR. 84)
Witness indicated that the east entrance of the driveway
should be through the driveway. (TR. 84) It was not intended to be entered by cutting in from the north. They
blocked him out from using the driveway when they went
in that way. ( TR. 85) With the wall, the Respondents
had the same use of the Right of Way as they always had.
There was an entrance to it. The wall had more or less
cleaned up between the two buildings. ( TR. 87) He intended to black top the area further and if done it \vou1d
make the right of way 11.77 Feet \vide up to the enst end.
( TH. DG)
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Os-car H. \Vood, a Witness for Appellant, testified:
l-Ie took out the steel posts in December of 1955. They
were five and a half inches outside measurement and as
placed were from 4 1/2 to 5 feet above the ground. (TR.
100 and 101) They were located on the north line of the
right of way. (TR. 101) The foundation for the wall was
placed where the pipes had been. (TR. 103) He made a
test and there is an abutment or post of the \V"ilkins-on
I3uilding that sets out in the driveway about 17 inches.
(TR. 107) Where Respondents are using the Right of
'Vay on the west end it is about 14 feet wide. That he had
no difficulty in driving his car down the driveway. The
\Yall had removed a hazard. (TR. 111 and 112) He bad
seen oil poured in the right of way by \\~ilkinson employees. ( TR. 113) After the \Vall \Yas placed, there was
no more oil in the right of way. (TR. 113) \\~ith the "\\ all
up the alleyway \Yas straight and you could see from one
end to the other. (TR. 117).
7

Respondents and Appellant rested. (TR. 123) The
,Jury \vas then taken to Yie\v the premises. (TR. 123)
Appellant reserves the right to make further statement of any pertinent fact not hereinbefore set forth.
The C·ourt submitted the cause to the Jury on Special
Interrogatories. Interrogatory No. 1 being: ·'Do you
find by the preponderance of the eYidenre that the defendant designated an access on the northeast side- of the
'red area' and that the plaintiffs aceepted the access,
11sef1 it, and the defendant then blocked it \Yithout the
plaintiffs hHving· nhandonrd said access;~" (R 49) The
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Answer of the Jury thereto was ''Yes". (R 49) Interrogatory No.2 was:'' (Answer only if you have answered
interrogatory No. 1 'Yes'.) Do you find proven by the
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of the wrongful blocking of
the access to the right-of-way by the construction of the
wall in question~'' The answer of the Jury thereto was
"No''. (R. 49)
Appellant promptly filed Motion to Set Aside the
Verdict of the Jury and to enter Judgment Of No Cause
Of Action or to grant a New Trial on the grounds that
such Answers were inconsistent and that the Verdict
was contrary to the evidence. Motion for New Trial was
also j·oined therein. (R. 78 and 79) The Trial Court
denied such Motions. (R. 91).
· The Trial Court thereupon made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment approving the Answers ·of the Jury to said Special Interrogatories. (R. 85 to 90 Inclusive) Paragraph 3 of said
findings of Fact is as follows: "That there would be no
present and direct benefit to the plaintiffs to remove the
said wall '\vhere it obstructs the access of the plaintiffs
and the defendant should not be required to remove the
wall but the access may be of value in the future, also
public peace would be promoted by clearly defining
each's right." (R. 87) By its Judgment the Court adjudged that plaintiff has a right of access to said rightof-way through the area in which Defendant constructed
the wall for a width of 21 feet commencing at the easterly
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end of the wall and plaintiff was allowed to remove the
~rail for said distance of 21 feet. The Plaintiffs were also
granted nominal damages in the sum of 6 cents. (R. 89
and 90)

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 1 TO THE JURY.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 1 TO THE JURY.

For purposes of clarification reference is herewith
made to Respondents' Exhibit C. San1e sho,vs the Right
of Way in Red, the Block \r all in Blue Stripes, the Steel
Posts in Blue and also the Respondents' property for
which the Right of \\1 ay "\vas purchased in Y ello,v. Same
also sho,vs the respective Buildings of the parties hereto.
Said Right of Way runs from the East to the \\---est 160
Feet and from the Respondents' Property to the South
11 Feet. Respondents' Property is to the North of the
Right of \\T ay. Appellant's Property is South of the
Right of \Vay. The Northeast Side of the ''Red .L~rea ~,
is Respondents' Property upon 'vhieh n~ sho"\vn by the
J)iagrain 11H•re is no eonstrnction.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
Further, Respondents' Exhibit B, now referred to,
shows that Respondents purchased from Appellant and
others the Yellow Area at the back of their property
''Together 'vith a Right of Way over and through the
following described property.'' Thereafter the ''Red
Area'' is described more fully. From the Certificate of
Survey, Respondents' Exhibit A, the ''Red Area'' commences on the property of Appellant. Appellant's Exhibit 4 shows the Wall and the point where the Access in
question is situated.
The case eventually turned on not whether Appellant was obstructing the Right of Way as granted by
him to Respondents but whether or not Respondents
could enter such Right of Way from any angle they
wished.
The Trial Court recognized that the Right of Way
was founded upon a Deed. That was substantially stated
by the Court in the Court's Instructions 3 and 4. Basically, the case involved the interference with a Right
of Way. This Court has held in Nielsen vs. SGJndberg,
105 Utah 93, 141 P. 2d. 696, at Page 103 thereof as follows:
''A right of way founded upon a deed or grant
is limited to the uses and extent thereof as fixed
by the grant or deed.''
If this is followed then Respondents obtained a Right of
"\\'ay or the Red Area to go to the Yell ow Area and
nothing more. llowever, the Trial Court interjected further point by giving to the .Tury Instruction No.5 (R. 56)
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and Appellant Excepted to it. (TR. 125 and 126). Respondent al~so Excepted to certain portions of it. ( TR. 124
and 125). Reference is made to such Instruction No. 5.
(R. 56) It is quoted as follows:
''The deed in question is silent as to where
the plaintiff may enter the right-of-way on to the
east.. Because the right-of-way runs to a public
highway, the law concludes the plaintiffs have a
right to enter or leave at the meeting of the rightof-way and the public highway. The plaintiff
would n-ot acquire a right to enter the ''red area''
through the northeast side of the ''red area'' by
any provision of the deed. However, if you find
all of the following elements proven by the plaintiffs by the preponderance of the evidence, then
you will find that plaintiffs did acquire such an
access and the defendant wrongfully blocked it.
The elements are:
1.

That the defendant, ~Ir. Carlos \l'" ood,
either expressly or impliedly designated
an access-""'ay along the northeast side of
the ''red area''.

2.

That the plaintiffs expressly or impliedly
accepted that designation and used the
access.

3.

That the plaintiffs did not either expressly or impliedly surrender said access, if
any, on the northeast side of the ''red
area'' before the 'vall ''"'as built.
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If you find each of these elements so pro;ven, you
'vill ansvver interrogatory number one "yes" and
proceed to the next interrogatory. If you answer
''no'' you have disposed of the case and need not
consider the other interrogatories.''
D:awn to the word "However", Appellants have no
quarrel vvith such Instruction. From such word on the
Instruction had no basis in fact nor law for being given.
The evidence of Respondents was that the Steel Posts
consisting of Three were erected. ( TR. 27) Respondents
stated date of erection thereof as November, 1954. (TR.
38) Appellant stated they were erected on Thanksgiving
Day of 1953 (TR. 58) after a survey so they would be on
his property line. (TR. 58) Appellant and Respondent,
Harold Vlilkinson, did get together and agreed on hovv
high the 'vall should be at one time. ( TR. 84) This fact
\vas not disputed by Respondents. The 'vall was built on
the same line as the steel poles had been on. ( TR. 64 and
65) Also, in measuring the right of vvay width, they
measured from the south side of the steel posts. Appellant's Exhibit 1 is a picture of the sturdy steel posts so
removed. Respondents admitted they had no rig·ht of
'vay over Appellant's property before they purrhased the
right of way. (TR. 35 and 36) Before the wall was erected the right of way demarcation was indicated by three
steel posts. (TR. 47) Respondents made no protests when
the steel pipes were placed on the right of way. (TR. 49)
Under snch fact.s

pre~ented

to the Court., Appellant con-
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tends that the Instruction e;omplained of was not pertinent to this case. The Trial Court semed concerned about
an easement of access which was not a part of this case.
The ·easement was the right of way founded upon the
deed.
The Trial Court while instructing the Jury as aforesaid did not enlighten the Jury on the meaning of the
word '' Acceg.s' '. Appellant testified that Respondents
instead of using the ''Access'' or east entrance to the
driveway would come from the side and use it sideways
and come right in to his traffic and it created a bad situation. (TR. 63) Appellant surely was certain of such
meaning. In Dexter & N. R. Co. vs. Foster, et al, 119 N.Y.
S. 731, 64 Misc. Rep. 500, the Court at page 733 says:
''The word 'access' is defined as a way of
approach or entrance, passage, path, means of
approach, way of entrance, or passage to anything.''
The Trial Court determined that the Jury decide the
case on access without defining it for the Jury. It ,yas
not too much of in1port that the easement or right of "\Vay
was founded on a deed. The Trial Court in said Instruction No. 5 (R. 56) inforn1ed the Jury that the deed "Tas
silent as to where the plaintiff could enter the right of
\Vay. No Deed usually contains or sets forth such port
of entry. The right of 'vny is rlefined by the Deed and
that is its extent.
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The Trial Court overlooked the fact that the particular access involved was not one from a highway but actually from the property of Respondents. Construction of
the Deed, Respondent's Exhibit B, cannot make appurtenant the property of Respondents other than the
Yellow Area to the Right of Way. In 17 Am. Jur. Sec.
119, Page 728 the following is stated:
''A grant or reservation of a right to pass
upon a private way to one lot does not confer the
right to pass further upon the same way to
another lot. Similarly, a right of way appurtenant
to a particular tract cannot be used as a mode of
access to another lot to vvhich it is not appurtenant
even though there is no resulting burden.''
By his acts in placing steel posts on the boundary
line of the right of way, Appellant cannot be accused of
designating any access way to Respondents. Further,
the steel posts were removed and the wall complained of
was placed as the line of demarcation. Appellant had
absolute right to fence the right of way. In Willing vs.
Booker, 168 S. E. 417, lnO Va. 461, at Page 419 thereof
the Court says:
"Ownership of land carried with it the right
to a division fence on common boundaries of adjoining lands. The right and the burden of owners
of adjoining land are common and legal. That different estates or interests may exist in one parcel
of surh lands does not destroy or affect the com-
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mon right and burden. Each estat·e and interest in
each parcel of the land may enjoy the right, and
from it's inception is subject to the possible burden of the exercise of the right unless it has been
freed expressly or impliedly by the parties (or
their predeces~s.ors in the title) who own each of
the adjoining parcels of land and those creating
the estate or interest.''
Absolute disregard of the inherent right of Appellant
to fence the right of way was made. The Trial Court in
submitting such Interrogatory neglected this fundamental factor in the case. In 28 C. J. S. Sec. 98 (a), Page 7b0
it is stated:
''The owner of the servient estate may erect
fences along the sides of a way, but not across or
within the way so as to obstruct it entirely."
The Trial Court failed to consider at all times the
right of Appellant to fence the way and his right to 1·ely
on the construction of the Deed as to the extent of the
easement granted Respondents.
In Dyba vs. Borowitz, 136 Pa. Super. 532, 7 A. 2d.
500 the real crux of the issue in this case was met head
on. The Court at page 501 thereof says :
''The oft repeated rule is that the 'vords in a
grant are to be construed in their ordinarv
. and
natural sense, and that they are to be given a
reasonable ronRtruction in accord \Yith the intention of the parties. * * * ,,. . e find no words in this
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grant that expressly or impliedly forbid the erection of boundary fence, nor does the proof establish any circumstances that deprives defendant of
that right. There was no proof or finding of fact
by the chancellor of any interference with the
right of ingre·ss, egress and regress 'through and
over' the alley. Concedely, no gates, barrier or
obstruction of any kind was erected therein that
would deprive plaintiff of the use of it. They have
access to either terminus as they did prior to the
erection of .the fence. We think the language of
the grant does not justify the conclusion that the
plaintiffs have the privilege to enter or cross the
alley at any point. ' '
In the case at bar, no interference with Respondents'
right of ingress, egress and regress through and over
the right of way was proven. They still used it the
same as before. They still had access to either terminus
as before. Truly, the language of the Deed, Respondents' Exhibit B, did not grant to them the right to enter
or cross the right of way at any point they desired . .Appellant did not substantially interfere 'Nith the easement
he granted l{espondents. Quoting further from the case
of Dyba vs. Borowitz, supra, the Court at Page 502 thereof says:
''In Af ercantile Library Co. vs. Fidelity Trust
Co., supra, (235 Pa. Page 15, 83 A. Page 595) the
Court said 'The ·o-vvner of the servient soil has the
right to make use of his property as he chooses,
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if by ·SO doing he does not substantially interfere
with the easement'. Other cases sustaining this
principle are Connery vs. Brooke, supra, Hartman vs. Frick, 167 Pa. 18, 31 A. 342, 46 Am. St.
Rep. 658, Graham vs. Water Pow·er Corp., supra,
Kohler vs. Smith, 3 Pa. Super. 176, Helw·ig vs.
Miller, 47 Pa. Super. 171; Ziegler vs. Hoffman,
78 Pa. Super. 115.
While we have found no case and none has
been cited expressly deciding th·e question before
us, the right to build a fence along a right of way
is generally recognized in other jurisdictions. See
Guse vs. Flohr, et al. 195 Wis. 139, 217 N. W. 730,
Good vs. Petticrew, et al., 165 Va. 526, 183 S. E.
217; Willing vs. Booker, 160 Va. 461, 168 S. E. 4i7.
'Unquestionable the owner of a servient tenement
may f.ence along the way or not, as his con;venience may dictate' 9 R. C. L. p. 801, Sec. 56. 'The
owner .of a servient estate may erect fenees along
the sides of a way, but not across the \Yay as to
obstruct it' 19 C. J. p. 986, Sec. 240.
It is true that there was no fence \Yhen this
easement was created and none was erected for a
period of almost eig-hteen ~Tears thereafter, and
those facts are 'vorthv... of eonsideration. But theY
.
are not sufficient to depriYe the servient O"\vner
·of his inherent right to use his property as he sees
fit, including the erertion of a div-ision fenre "\Yith
suitable access to the easement. It n1ust be horne
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in mind that all that was granted was a right of
way 'through and over two and ninety six hundredths (2 16/.00) feet wide.' The fundamental
right to erect a fence upon the boundary line cannot be taken away from the owner of the fee by
that language. ''
Appellant did not intend that such easement be so
used by Respondents with the resultant burden to him.
Construing, as we must, the Deed, he assumed that the
Right of Way was to be over the 11 feet only and carefully preserved open either and both terminus thereof.
This C·ourt in Wade vs. Domais, 52 Utah 310, 173 P. 564,
at Page 316 thereof quotes with appro.val as follows:
''In Norris vs. Blant, 49 Utah at Page 243,
161 Pac. at Page 1133, this Court says: 'In construing any grant of right of way the use, in
character and extent, is limited to such as is reasonably nece.ssary and convenient to the do1ninant
estate and as little burdensome to the servient
estate as possible for the use contemplated.' . "
Appellant asserts that the use demanded by Respondents
placed a burden on the servient estate not contemplated
by the Deed. In Houghtalling vs. Stoothoff, 19 N. Y. S.
2d. 510, the Court at Page 511 says:
"Plaintiff is entitled to nothing more than an
nnoh~tructed right of passage. Pro.vided only that
the right of passage is not obstructed, the o"\vners
. of the servient tenement are entitlPd to fence their
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land. Bail vs. Bail, 108 N. Y. 511, 15 N. E. 538. ''
Appellant clearly reeognized the right of Respondents
and provided such unobstructed passage to which they
are entitled. The Deed cannot possibly be construed
to grant Respondents port of entry as interpreted by
the Trial Court. If this be so, then all Deeds granting
Easements had best specify such port -of entry or negative such entry at all angles chooseable to the holder of
the same.
Under the facts and the law it was truly error on
the part of the Trial Court to submit the cause to the
Jury on solely Interrogatory No.1. Even so, the Answer
of Yes thereto of the Jury is contrary to the evidence.
The Jury completely ignored the fact that ther-e had
been steel posts on the property line and that .Appellant
and Respondent, Harold Wilkinson, did get together
and at one time agreed how high the wall should be
placed. (TR. 84) This testimony of Appellant was
never controverted and could not support a finding that
Appellant designated an access-w·ay. Respondents ''ere
fully aware that they 'Yere not to use the X ortheast
Side of the ''Red Area'' to enter upon said 11 Feet.
Under the e:vidence before it the Jury in making sucb
Answer rendered a \T erdict absolutely contrary to the
evidence and not supported by ~uch eYidence. However, considering the Ans,ver of No of the Jury to Interrogatory No. 2 ":ith its 1-r es Ans"'"er to X o. 1, there
is no doubt thnt the .J nry ''a~ r.otnplcte1y confused by
the erroneous Ins trncti on No. ;) of the Court and also
thP PJToneous IntPrrog·atory X o. 1.
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT.
Up·on rendition of such Answ·ers by the Jury, Appellant promptly filed Motion and Motion For New
Trial (R. 78 and 78A) pointing out to the Trial Court
the error and inconsistency of the Answers of the Jury
and requesting entry of Judgment Of No Cause of Action
or that a New Trial be granted. Appellant submitted
to the Trial Court a Memorandum Of Authorities. (R.
79 to 84 Inclusive). Reference thereto is herewith made.
Thereafter the Trial Court apparently adopted and
approved the Answers of the Jury and made and entered
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
based thereon. (R. 85 to 90 inclusive). While stating
that such Answers were adopted and approved, the
Trial Court, despite the Answer of No of the Jury to
Interrogatory No. 2 by which the Jury found that Re·spondents suffered no damage, proceeded to award to
Respondents against Appellant nominal damages of 6
cents. This was error as a verdict for no damages can
never be construed as one for no1ninal damages. The
rule is well stated in 25 C.•J. S. Section 189 (A) as
follows:
''A verdict for 'no damages' rannot be construed as one for nominal damages.''
Also in }/[ endenhall vs. Struck, 207 Iowa 1094, 224 N. ,V.
95, the Court at Page 1100 thereof states:
''A 'no damage' verdict cannot be viewed as
a verdict for nominal damages.''
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Having by Paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact (R. 86)
approved the Answers of the Jury, the Trial Court
then proceeded to enter Judgment absolutely contrary
thereto.
There is additional Finding of Fact of the Trial
Court which does not support the Judgment as rendered
by the Trial Court. Note is made of Paragraph 3 of
the Findings of Fact of the Court. (R. 87) Quotation
thereof is made: ''That there "\vould be no present and
direct benefit to the Plaintiff to remove the said wall
where it obstructs the access of the plaintiff and the
defendant should not be required to remove the wall
but the access may be of value in the future, also public
peace would be promoted by clearly defining each's
right.'' The Trial Court, apparently viewed the Answers
and V·erdict of the Jury as being for the Appellant, but
then proceeded to enter J udgn1ent against Appellant
that Respondents could ren1ove the \\. . all for 21 Feet.
Respondents in this action sought injunctive relief. They
were not entitled to the s.ame. Respondents indicate by
their Statement of Points of Respondents on Appeal
(R. 97) that they will contend that the entire \Yall should
be removed. Detern1ina tion of 21 Feet of removal of
the "\Vall is not satisfactory to them. It is somewhat
conjecture as to how such 21 Feet \Yas arri,Ted at by
the Trial Court. Referring to Respondents' Exhibit C,
the Diagran1, the Easen1ent \Yith the ,,... all \Yas substantially the 11 Feet \Yidth as called for by the Deed.
Despit0 the usP of the \Yord "\\Tongful" in Interrogatory
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No. 2, (R. 49) the Jury found no damages resulted to
Respondents. The Answer of the Jury -could not have
been other\vise under the evidence submitted by Respondents on the question of their damages. Thusly,
the Trial Court found that there would be no pres-ent
and direct benefit to Respondents to remove the wall.
The ·evidence showed no substantial interference with
the Easement of 11 Feet and the Jury found Respondents suffered no damage. Respondents should thereupon have been denied the relief they sought. It was
error for the Trial Court to do otherwise. In Clough
vs. W. H. Healy Co. 53 Cal. App. 397, 200 P. 378, the
Court at Page 379 thereof says:
"To entitle complainant to equitable relief
the right must be clear and an injunction of the
character herein in question will be denied when
the obstruction does not constitute a material interference with the right of the owner of the easement, or where the damage sustained by him is
merely nominal. * * * In the case at bar there was
no wilfull or deliberate invasion ~f the plaintiff's
right of way, nor was there any breach of the
agreement respecting it after its change of location. The plaintiff has suffered no damage.''
Respondents, upon the evidence adduced by them
showed no right to the relief demanded by them and no
right to the removal of the wall or any portion thereof.
Their principal and only complaints against the vvall
were that it took them two to three minutes more to
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ance of daily loss of two man hours; (TR. 31) and that
they would have more use of the 11 feet. (TR. 33) Appellant stated that it was for the benefit of both that it
be used as a driveway. (TR. 62) Instead of using the
''Access'' or east entrance to the driveway they would
come from the side and right in to his traffic. (TR. 63)
Ap.pellant's object in building the \vall was to make a
definite right of way down through the two businesses
and to stop their dumping of their refuse in to· the
driveway. (TR. 64) Appellant showed use by Respondents of the easement beyond its original purpose. Respondents \vere casting a greater burden on it than
permissible. In 17 Cal. J ur. 2d. Section 27, at Page 131,
it is stated:
I

''The owner of an easement has no right to
commit a trespass on the serYient tenement. He
must use the easement in such a manner as to impose as slight a burden upon the servient estate
as practicable.''
The Trial Court by it Finding of Fact, Paragraph
3 and heretofore quoted, chose to delve in to the future,
while finding that presently there 'Yas no benefit to
Respondents by removal of the 'vall. The obstruction
was required to be a n1aterial interference 'Yith Respondents' use of the right of \vay before the Trial
Court could act. The present was involved not the
future. In 17 Cal. ,Jur. :?d. Sec. 50 at Pagc~s 163 and
164 it is stated:
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"But an injunction \Vill be denied where the
obstruction sought to be removed does not constitute a material interference with the right of the
owner of the easement, or where the damages sustained by him is merely nominal. vVhere removal
of the obstruction would bring no actual advantage
or the expenses entailed thereby would be entirely
disproportionate to the benefit resulting, the oomplainan t will be relegated to his legal remedy for
the vindication of his right.''
The interest of the Trial Court as stated in said
Paragraph 3 of the Findings, heretofore quoted, regarding promotion of the public peace was adequately
provided for by Paragraph 5 of the Findings (R. 87)
whereby the parties stipulated in Open Court that a
permanent injunction issue against both parties from
blocking the right of way. The Judgment in Paragraph
3 thereof, (R. 90) permanently enjoins both parties
from blocking or obstructing the right of way. Such enj·oinment of both parties should have disposed of the
case but the Trial Court deemed it requisite to allow
removal of 21 Feet of the Wall by Respondents. Appellant was entitled to maintain the Wall or he was not entitled to do so. The Judgment of the Trial Court is
erroneous in granting such removal of the portion of
the Wall and in awarding Respondents non1inal damag-es from Appellant.
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CONCLUSION
By reason of the palpable errors of the Trial Court
in this cause, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment should be by this Court set aside and
reversed and the cause Remanded back to the Trial
Court with directions to enter Judgment Of No Cause
Of Action in favor of Appellant and against Respondents but with the Trial Court to enjoin both parties
in such Judgment from blocking or obstructing the right
of way.
Respectfully Submitted,

BARCLAY AND BARCLAY
Attorneys For Defendant and
Appellant
109-110-111 Atlas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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